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The intention of the buyout program is to reduce vulnerability by removing homes from the floodplain. 
But vulnerability is not just measured by physical exposure to risk. It is the capacity to anticipate, cope 
with, resist, and recover from shocks (Fothergill & Peek 1999, cited Blaikie et al., 1994), which must 
account for the social, economic, and political context in which a disaster occurs. While experts see the 
buyout program as a viable hazard mitigation strategy, buyouts may have unknown consequences as 
they permanently alter the physical, social, and economic landscape. To better understand their impact, 
I studied the effect of the buyouts in North Carolina following Fran and Floyd after the Recession on 
communities that participated. The findings indicate that buyout neighborhoods have a larger percent 
Black population and are more economically stressed than those without buyouts. Buyout 
neighborhoods also fared worse after the Recession than those without buyouts. When assessing the 
impact of buyouts on home purchase loan approvals, the likelihood of being approved for a 
conventional home purchase loan increases with the neighborhood’s concentration of buyouts from 
Fran and Floyd. This holds true both before and after the Recession. However, this trend only proved 
statistically significant for Black applicants after the Recession. Buyout neighborhoods therefore provide 
greater opportunity for Black home-ownership. Yet, their proximity to the floodplain undermines the 






















Natural disasters, such as hurricane Katrina, Matthew, Irma, and Harvey, force us to confront the reality 
that many of our communities are vulnerable to serious environmental hazards. In the U.S., floods are the 
costliest of natural disasters and the financial losses to homeowners and government are climbing (Brody, 
Zahran, Maghelal, Grover, & Highfield, 2007).  As more people move to flood prone areas and coastal 
development increases, the concentration of assets in high-risk areas will likely lead to greater losses in 
the future (NRC, 2006). This forecast has already proven true. From 1960 to 2004 the average annual 
property damages totaled $290.5 billion and as of 2015, this average has tripled to $686.3 billion (2015 
dollars), according to data from the Spatial Hazard Events and Losses Database for the United States 
(SHELDUS). 
The extent to which government is responsible for reducing vulnerability and losses is a focal point of 
criticism and debate.  Currently, hazard mitigation strategies and policies are the primary means by which 
governments intervene to reduce loss of life and property in the face of risk. In particular, acquisition of 
flood-prone properties using Federal Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) and Community 
Development Block Grant – Disaster Recovery (CDBG-DR) monies is considered a successful hazard 
mitigation strategy. These acquisitions are commonly referred to as “buyouts.”  
While immense time and money is spent on administering public post-disaster programs, their 
effectiveness remains uncertain. As disaster events become more prevalent, the costs of disaster recovery 
have skyrocketed and brought the buyout program under scrutiny (Song and Shaw 2017; de Vries, 2017; 
Mcghee, Albright, & Binder, 2017). To reduce losses, removing assets from high-risk areas seems a logical 
solution. The intention of the buyout program is to reduce vulnerability by removing homes from the 
floodplain. But vulnerability is not just measured by physical exposure to risk. It is the capacity to 
anticipate, cope with, resist, and recover from shocks (Fothergill & Peek 1999, cited Blaikie et al., 1994, p. 
9), which must account for the social, economic, and political context in which a disaster occurs.  
There is a gap in our understanding of how to use the buyout program to better serve communities that 
are most vulnerable to flooding. They create new open which can be converted into public recreational 
areas, adding an amenity for the surrounding community. Conversely, the impact of buyouts on the 
municipalities tasked with maintaining that space is uncertain. Municipalities that participate 
simultaneously sustain losses to their tax base as homeowners move out and receive additional public 
space they are responsible for managing. To improve disaster recovery and increase resilience, the pre-
disaster recovery planning should include strategies for how to employ the buyout program so that it adds 
amenities and value to communities rather than leaving behind vacant and often unkempt lots.  
After hurricane’s Fran and Floyd, North Carolina implemented a massive buyout program acquiring over 
5,000 properties across the state. Using data from the buyouts following Fran and Floyd, I assess how the 
concentration of buyouts within a neighborhood affects the likelihood of being approved for a home loan 
for Black and White applicants after the Great Recession. The results reveal that the bulk of the 
participants in the Floyd and Fran buyouts were in socially vulnerable neighborhoods (Cutter et al., 2008). 
Neighborhoods with buyouts improved in economic health, measured by median household income and 
median house value, at a lower rate compared to those without buyouts.  
After the Recession, Black home purchase loan applicants in buyout neighborhoods were more likely to 
be approved for a loan compared to neighborhoods without buyouts. For White applicants, buyouts had 
little effect on the likelihood of loan approval. While this finding is contrary to expectation, applicant 
incomes changed minimally compared to increases in loan amount in buyout neighborhoods compared 
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to non-buyouts neighborhoods. Additionally, stricter lending regulations affected the application sample 
post-Recession.  
This research sheds light on the disproportionate impact of buyouts on Black communities and 
households as they seek wealth building opportunities in neighborhoods that are not only economically 
struggling but flood prone. This research adds to our understanding of the long-term impacts of the 
buyout program by assessing whether buyouts effect access to home loan credit in the wake of a 
financial crisis. The findings underscore the importance of pre-disaster planning for buyouts to better 
account for and take advantage of the program’s externalities. We will better understand how 
government programs that attempt to reduce vulnerability have long term but varied effects on Black 
and White applicants and neighborhoods.  
The thesis is organized as follows.  In the literature review, I first provide background information 
regarding the flood recovery process in the United States and how federal policy interventions in local 
contexts post-disaster have changed over time. In this section I will also explain the details of the buyout 
program. Next, I describe current and past research on in impacts of buyouts, racial disparity in disaster 
recovery, access to housing credit via home loans at various points in U.S. history and with a review of 
what should be expected regarding changes in home loan approval rates before and after the Recession 
and how this may differ across racial lines also explains. Following the literature review, I narrate the 
effects of hurricanes Fran and Floyd and the subsequent buyout. I detail the methodology for this research 
project, and its limitations. I then present my results and discuss the findings and their implications for 
hazard mitigation and post-disaster recovery planning and policy.  
 
III. Literature Review 
Flood Recovery in the U.S. 
Federal acquisition of flood prone homes dates back to the relocation of flooded homes and businesses 
in Soldiers Grove, Wisconsin in the 1970s (David and Mayer 1984; Greer & Brokopp Binder, 2017). Hazard 
mitigation in the U.S historically consists of structural solutions, such as levees and damns; economic 
solutions, such as insurance; and educational approaches, including trainings and public risk awareness 
campaigns (Rubin, 2012). Structural mitigation efforts in particular have been criticized for incentivizing 
development in risky areas by creating a “safe-development paradox” (Burby, 2006).1 Non-structural 
mitigation techniques include educating property owners about their flood risk, providing flood insurance, 
altering zoning regulations, and conducting property acquisitions or “buyouts” (Zavar, 2015).  
The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Restrictive Act of 1988 details the extent of public 
assistance for presidential disaster declarations. The HMGP program outlined in the Act describes the 
three options for homeowners participating in the buyout program; the home can be elevated in place 
above the base flood elevation and any required freeboard; moved to another lot through demolition and 
rebuilding; or acquired and demolished. The latter of these options is what is most commonly referred to 
                                                          
1 As Burby (2006) explains, structural mitigation measures such as levees and damns reduce risk in previously risky 
areas but only so long as the infrastructure holds up and the hazard does not surpass its capacity to mitigate risk. 
By implementing structural fixes, the sense of caution towards development in a previously risky area is more or 
less ignored, increasing potential losses of life and property if a hazard of a certain magnitude impacts the area. 
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as a “buyout”. The homeowner voluntarily participates and is compensated for their property at pre-flood 
market value through a combination of federal and local government contributions2.  
The decision to offer a homeowner a buyout relies on the results of a cost-benefit analysis prioritizes 
maximizing the ratio of the cost of future losses to cost of acquiring the property. Buyouts are prioritized 
in areas most vulnerable to future flooding (within the 100-year floodplain). If the property owner takes 
the buyout, the property is usually acquired by the City, its structure removed, and the it is converted into 
public open space in perpetuity through a restrictive covenant. Since the 1990s, buyouts are increasingly 
used as a non-structural measure (Greer & Brokopp Binder, 2017). Between 1993 and 2011, the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) acquired over 40,000 flood-damaged properties through their 
Hazard Mitigation Grant Program (HMGP) (Aronoff 2017).3  
Not all buyouts involve the federal government but most occur in the aftermath of a federally declared 
disaster with the help of federal resources.4 Federal buyouts are funded through the (HMGP) as the 
primary source and Community Development Block Grants for Disaster Recovery (CDBG-DR)5 as the 
secondary. FEMA dedicates about 15-20% of their total funds in a disaster situation towards HMGP. These 
funds are only available to communities that participate in the National Flood Insurance Program. Both 
HMGP and CDBG-DR maintain the requirements that the buyouts be voluntary, homeowners be offered 
fair market value, and the land be maintained as open space in perpetuity (Greer & Brokopp Binder, 
2017).6 While buyout participants receive fair market value for their home, the net amount is often 
reduced after paying off the mortgages, and outstanding taxes. Furthermore, if the household received 
any FEMA monetary assistance, the sum of that assistance will also be subtracted from the final check 
they receive for their house. Each individual applicant’s own financial circumstances are a huge influence 
on the decision to take a buyout, sometimes despite the risk they face to future flooding. 
There is general agreement between floodplain managers, disaster recovery experts, FEMA, and local 
public officials that the higher the rate of participation in the buyout program, the more successful it is 
(Daniel H. de Vries, 2017; McCann, 2006; FEMA, 2003).  However, success is measured by reduction in 
potential asset losses, not effects on neighborhood characteristics or housing markets (Zavar, 2015).  
Recent studies question the extent to which buyouts reduce vulnerability for those who participate 
                                                          
2 The federal government usually commits 75% of the funds with a local 25% match. 
3 The total today is likely much higher as it does not account for Hurricanes Sandy, Matthew, Harvey, or Irma 
buyouts. 
4 Buyout programs do not only happen post-disaster with primarily federal monies. For example, Charlotte-
Mecklenburg, NC created a floodplain buyout program funded partially through grants from FEMA but also 
contains substantial local programmatic components. Since 2003, a portion of the local storm water fee has been 
set aside for the “rainy day fund” to be used for “Quick Buys”. Since 2012, a program called the Local Risk-Based 
Buyouts essentially does the same thing as post-disaster HMGP buyouts but is funded with 100% local monies 
from the storm water fee as well. 
http://charlottenc.gov/StormWater/Flooding/Pages/FloodplainBuyoutProgram.aspx 
5 CDBG-DR funds have been used since 1992 after Hurricane Andrew but have been used for recovery efforts 
beyond hurricanes including after the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City and the 
terrorist attacks in New York City on September 11, 2001. CDBG-DR funds can be used for three broad categories 
of activities including short-term disaster relief, mitigation activities, and long-term recovery. Buyouts generally fall 
within the mitigation activities category. (Gotham, 2014b) 
6 Traditionally, CDBG-DR funds are more flexible than HMGP with regard to what can be done with buyout 
properties after they are cleared. Non-participating communities have up to 6 months to apply to be a 
participating community post-disaster. (Presentation by David Salveson “Voluntary Buyouts as Hazard Mitigation; 
Implementing Buyouts” 9/17/2004. Mitigation. 
https://training.fema.gov/emiweb/downloads/breakingdisastercycle/session%204%20revised-ppt.pdf) 
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(McGhee, Albright, & Binder, 2017) and there is still little empirical consensus on how buyouts impact 
neighborhoods. Reviewing the literature on open space, social vulnerability, disaster recovery, and 
decision-making post-disaster provides a foundation to understanding buyout’s impacts. 
Buyouts as public open space 
Elyse Zavar is one of the few researchers investigating the impact of buyout induced open space induced 
on surrounding communities (Zavar & Hagelman III, 2016). Her study of the re-use of buyout properties 
found that residents viewed the buyout properties differently depending on how they were maintained 
and landscaped. In areas with little landscaping, they were seen as a wasted opportunity, but in areas with 
more investment in the buyout open space, the community perceived it as an amenity (Zavar, 2015). The 
greater the investment in the open space, the more likely it serves as an amenity. Moreover, high quality 
open space has significant positive effects on health outcomes (Cohen et al., 2007; Larson, Jennings, & 
Cloutier, 2016; Nowak, Crane, & Stevens, 2006; Villeneuve et al., 2012), and property values (Anderson & 
West, 2006; Lewis, Provencher, & Butsic, 2009), and a negative effect on crime rates (Kuo, Sullivan, Coley, 
& Brunson, 1998). Conversely, poor quality open space negatively effects the surrounding community by 
contributing to poorer mental health outcomes (Francis, Wood, Knuiman, & Giles-Corti, 2012) and less 
time spent outdoors (Lestan, Eržen, & Golobič, 2014).  For buyout properties, local context is crucial to 
understanding whether surrounding neighborhoods consider them an amenity or burden. 
Disaster Induced Relocation 
Relocation is inevitable following a buyout. Forced relocation disrupts one’s sense of place and the social 
fabric of neighborhoods. Buyouts are an instance of pseudo-voluntary relocation, as those who participate 
often decide to do so under unusual  pressure and trauma (de Vries, 2017). De Vries and colleagues (2017) 
found that trauma experienced immediately after a disaster is sometimes exploited as a window of 
opportunity to “woo” homeowners into accepting a buyout.7 The offer to participate in the program 
requires homeowners weigh the pros and cons of moving out of harm’s way and sacrificing their sense of 
belonging in their community. Place attachment is often a reason for not taking a buyout. The emotional 
bonding of people, groups, and communities to their physical surroundings is a significant part of people’s 
lives (Mishra, Mazumdar, & Suar, 2010), and is strongly correlated with robust neighborhood and 
community ties (Lewicka, 2010). Place attachment and community attachment produces a sense of 
comfort and security which is often disrupted in disaster events (Mishra et al., 2010; Phillips, Stukes, & 
Jenkins, 2012).  Buyouts contribute to increased stress and anxiety for those who participate as they lose 
the benefits of place attachment and community (Hogg, Kingham, Wilson, & Ardagh, 2016).   
Neighborhood Change and Hazards 
As a dynamic social and political entity, endogenous and exogenous shocks constantly change 
neighborhoods. Disasters can act as exogenous shocks that induce shifts in a neighborhood’s trajectory 
(Lee, 2017). A natural disaster’s effect on a neighborhood’s change trajectory depends on the pre-disaster 
conditions and composition of the neighborhood. Disasters are the product of the social, political, and 
economic environments in which they occur (Fothergill & Peek, 1999 cited Blaikie, Cannon, Davis, and 
Wilsner, 1994, p.3).  
                                                          
7 Dr. Daniel De Vries (2017) studied the buyouts after Hurricane Floyd in Kinston, NC where 95% of those offered a 
buyout accepted, a large portion of which lived in an historically Black community, Lincoln City. He found that local 
government strategies and tactics played a large role in persuading buyout recipients to take the offer, many of 
whom felt their acceptance of the buyout was involuntary (de Vries, 2017).   
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Neighborhood change is measured by studying changes in an neighborhood’s socio-economic status, 
household value and type, and racial diversity (Galster, Hayes, & Johnson, 2005; Quercia & Galster, 2000). 
The more damage sustained, the more likely a neighborhood undergoes change. However, similar levels 
of damage do not indicate similar levels or directions of change across neighborhoods of differing 
characters. Socio-economic status and race are strong determinants of disaster induced neighborhood 
change (Lee, 2017).  For example, wealthier coastal communities may sustain the same or more severe 
levels of damage as those inland but a household’s individual resources and their community’s political 
sway can reduce negative impacts and induce less neighborhood change than communities with fewer 
resources (Lee, 2017).  
Inequitable Disaster Recovery  
Inequitable recovery results in spatially uneven recovery as the disaster recovery system often fails to 
meet the needs of those most vulnerable (Bullard & Wright, 2012; Gotham, 2014(a); Gotham 2014 (b)).  
Disasters amplify pre-disaster conditions making equity central to discussions of the disaster recovery 
system (Cutter, Mitchell, & Scott, 2012; Fothergill, Maestas, & Darlington, 1999; Gotham, 2014a; 
Montgomery & Chakraborty, 2015). Socially vulnerable communities have less control over local 
governments and weaker political power to direct resources and attention to their recovery needs (Lee 
2017). Susan Cutter’s social vulnerability index (SVI) identifies demographic, economic, and built 
environment characteristics as key contributors to hazard vulnerability (Cutter et al., 2008; Cutter, Boruff, 
& Shirley, 2003; Cutter et al., 2012; Emrich & Cutter, 2011).  Communities of color, aging populations, 
older homes, and gender are just a few of the indicators. Cutter argues that communities with higher 
levels of social vulnerability (Cutter et al., 2003, 2012) have less access to financial and economic capital 
and resources needed for complete recovery.  As a consequence, these households are more reliant on 
government monies to recover yet, they are the least likely to receive it. They often  have little experience 
with the recovery system and navigating government programs, affecting their access to much needed 
help (Lee, 2017).  Socially vulnerable populations are also more likely to be permanently displaced from 
their homes and participate in the buyout program  (de Vries, 2017; Fothergill et al., 1999; Fothergill & 
Peek, 2004; Gotham, 2014a, 2014b). 
Race in particular has a significant impact on one’s social vulnerability. Black neighborhoods on average 
have lower home values and less access to credit than White.8 In a disaster event, Black households are 
then at a significant disadvantage because recovery aid and insurance payouts are based on the dollar 
amount of losses. People with higher value assets then receive the majority of financial assistance which 
is critical to recouping losses and rebuilding homes (Peacock & Girard, 1997).  Additionally, communities 
of color are more exposed to environmental hazards than White communities (Blaikie et al., 1994; 
Fothergill & Peek, 1999; Abel, 2008; Fussel, 2010; Lerner & Brown, 2012; Banzhaf, 2012; Johnson Gaither, 
2015; Montgomery & Chakraborty, 2015). Hurricane Katrina has iconized the inequity of disaster recovery. 
As one of the largest disaster’s in US history, Katrina’s aftermath is one of the most studied disasters 
because of the its disparate impact on communities of color.  
Effectiveness of Buyouts in Reducing Vulnerability 
While buyouts are considered an effective means of reducing losses of life and property, McGhee and 
colleagues (2017) found that those who participate do not always move into less vulnerable areas. After 
                                                          
8 Historically, block busting, which inflated housing prices for Black homeowners, resulted in their being more 
financially strained than their White counter parts. Additionally, redlining reduced Black communities’ access to 
capital as they were unable to get home loans or insurance. Consequently, Black households often used cheaper 
and therefore less resilient building materials and secondary insurance companies.  
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hurricane Sandy, over 20% of buyout participants moved areas at least as exposed to coastal flood hazards 
as their previous residence (McGhee, Albright, & Binder, 2017). Additionally, 321 of the 323 buyout 
participants studied relocated to areas with higher levels of social vulnerability (Mcghee et al., 2017). 
These findings stress the need for more comprehensive evaluation of buyouts beyond simplistic economic 
indicators.  
Who Takes a Buyout? 
The factors influencing one’s decision to take a buyout ranges from perceived flood-risk, socio-economic 
status, length of residence, and the broader community’s participation (Binder et al., 2015; Kick, Fraser, 
Fulkerson, Mckinney, & de Vries, 2011). The research suggests that peer influence (i.e. if you’re neighbor 
participates or not) is the strongest influence on participation (Binder et al., 2015). However, this finding 
does not support theories of collective relocation organized by residents to maintain community cohesion 
(Bukvic & Owen, 2017).  After Fran and Floyd, flooded Black communities such as Princeville, North 
Carolina mistrusted the State and Federal authority and were less willing to participate in the buyout 
program (Phillips et al., 2012). 
Between the cost of rebuilding and rising flood insurance premiums, a buyout offer is enticing. Recently, 
New Orleans Public Radio, WWNO, conducted several interviews with Louisiana residents, hazard 
mitigation officials, and flood management specialists. When asked, many residents initially did not want 
to leave their homes. However, investigators found that at the right price, they would leave. Some 
residents even hoped to be bought out just to be given the opportunity to leave the flood prone area. 
Financial security is to a strong factor in a homeowner’s decision to take a buyout (Wendland, 2018).  
Factors Determining Home Loan Denials  
Economic characteristics of a loan applicant and the neighborhood they are in are strong predictors of 
loan denials. Traditionally there are three elements to consider when writing a mortgage loan. They 
include assessing the capacity of the borrower to manage the mortgage payments, assessing the credit 
worthiness of the borrowers, and assessing the strength of the collateral backing the loan(Munnell, 
Tootell, Browne, & Eneaney, 1996). The probability of default can be predicted by the applicant’s credit 
worthiness, their debt to income ratio, the stability of their income, housing price index, regional 
unemployment rates, and the loan amount requested (Ards, Ha, Mazas, & Myers, 2014; Munnell et al., 
1996; Wheeler & Olson, 2015). Race and ethnicity are strong determinants (Ards et al., 2014; Munnell et 
al., 1996; Wheeler & Olson, 2015; Ezeala-Harrison & Glover, 2008; Cherian, 2014).  
The three loan standards mentioned above were relaxed in the 1990s. IT was uncommon to relax more 
than one but in by the early and mid-2000s, lenders often relaxed all three standards (Belsky & Richardson, 
2010). As more and more people gained access to housing credit, homeownership became possible for a 
larger portion of the population. This fueled an increase in home prices as demand for homes outpaced 
supply (Weinberg, 2013). Home prices more than doubled in the U.S. between 1998-2006 and mortgage 
debt rose from 61% to 97% in the same period. The expansion of the housing market peaked in 2006 and 
by December of 2007, the US economy entered into a recession and bottomed out in the middle of 2009. 
Home prices fell by over one fifth from the first quarter of 2007 to the second quarter of 2011 (Weinberg, 
2013).  
The Recession disproportionately affected minority borrowers. Between January 2007 and June 2008, 
HUD estimated that the rates of foreclosure were highest among low income minority neighborhoods 
(Belsky & Richardson, 2010; Calem, Hershaff, & Wachter, 2004). This disproportionate impact is in part 
the result of sub-prime lenders targeting minority borrowers (Belsky & Richardson, 2010). The most 
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subprime lending activity occurred in majority Black or Hispanic , with lower incomes, higher 
unemployment rates, but low poverty levels (Kingsley & Pettit, 2009; Mayer & Pence, 2008). ).  
Subprime lending increased foreclosures., For those who were able to hold onto their homes, recovery of 
property values depended on the racial majority of the neighborhood. Black neighborhood property 
values declined sharply post-Recession while, predominantly White, middle and upper-income 
neighborhoods recovered from any housing price declines (Raymond et al., 2016).  
After the Recession, access to home credit through loans dropped across the U.S (Mccoy, 2017). However, 
the tighter mortgage markets disproportionately affected racial minorities, curbing housing demand in 
Black and Hispanic neighborhoods (Goodman, Zhu, & George, 2015). Due to stricter credit requirements, 
the number of home purchase loans to Black borrowers in 2013 declined by 50 percent compared to 2001 
levels, pre-subprime boom while for White borrowers, it declined 31 percent (Goodman et al., 2015).   
Following the Recession, unemployment rose more for socially disadvantaged groups including African 
Americans and Hispanics compared to White (Danziger, 2013). Fewer Black men are now in high-wage 
and mid-wage occupations while their representation in low-wage occupations did not change (Holder, 
2011). This indicates they were pushed out of the labor market entirely and are still over-represented in 
low-wage occupations. 
Changes to mortgage lending practices post-Recession 
In response to the Great Recession, the federal government took steps to regulate banking activities 
including the passing of the Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform Act of 2010. The Act details regulations for 
Wall Street with three sections dedicated to mortgage lending regulations.  The Act also instituted the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) tasked with ensuring compliance with federal law governing 
residential mortgage loans. The CFPB has helped reduce the likelihood of predatory lending and 
misleading advertising for mortgage products including instituting the Qualified Mortgage Rule in January 
of 2014 (Belsky & Richardson, 2010; Olsen & Nguyen, 2014). Qualified mortgages are those in which the 
borrower does not have a debt-income ratio of greater than 43%, lenders have verified the borrower’s 
income, the mortgage does not last for more than 30 years, and fees and points do not exceed 3% of the 
loan amount.   
Small creditors loan denial rates increased slightly in the 40 days after the rules implementation for both 
refinancing and home purchase loans while other creditors saw a small decline in denial rates (Bhutta & 
Ringo, 2015). Nationwide, the Federal Reserve determined the number of mortgage originations have 
increased consistently from 2012-2015 with a 22 percent increase from 2014-2015 (Bhutta & Ringo, 2016). 
This increase is due in part to the QRM pre-screening applicants and eliminating high-risk borrowers 
before they apply. 
 
IV. Hurricanes Fran and Floyd in North Carolina 
Hurricanes Fran and Floyd hit North Carolina just three years apart, becoming the two costliest disasters 
in the State’s history. In North Carolina alone, Fran caused over $5 billion in damage and Floyd over $6 
billion.  Fran’s damage resulted from mostly high winds while Floyd brought significant inland flooding 
(Glovovic and Smith, 2014).  
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In the evening of September 16, 1999, 
Hurric ane Floyd made landfall in Cape 
Fear, North Carolina, dumping 15-20 
inches of rain in under 24 hours.9 
While Floyd had downgraded from a 
category 4 to a category 1 hurricane by 
the time it made landfall, Hurricane 
Dennis had already saturated the land 
11 days prior. As a result, Floyd, caused 
unprecedented flooding for North 
Carolina, which disproportionately 
affected lower-income and mid to 
small-sized communities in the 
Eastern part of the state (Glovovic and 
Smith, 2014).  
Floyd caused 52 deaths in North Carolina, flooded over 45,000 homes, and destroyed 7,300 (over 50% 
damaged). The Red Cross housed about 50,000 people in emergency shelters. Many of the communities 
most affected were already experiencing economic hardship with high unemployment rates and related 
outmigration (Delia 2001). The effects of Floyd in many cases expedited the areas trajectories.   
The buyout program also contributed to significant population loss in these towns. After Fran, many 
residents were reluctant to participate. Upon seeing surrounding homes demolished to be turned into 
open space, remaining residents realized holding out would result in being one of a few residents left and 
decided to take the buyout. After Fran, in anticipation of receiving more federal funding to continue the 
program, municipalities prepared grant proposals to continue acquisitions.  
Floyd hit most of the same areas inundated by Fran. As expected, funding from the federal and state 
government flowed to the same communities to continue the buyout process and this time, local officials 
had experience administering the program and already prepared applications for property acquisition. 
Institutional memory and the readily available funding allowed the buyout process after Floyd to occur 
relatively quickly (Glovovic and Smith, 2014). Following both Fran and Floyd, $500 million was invested in 
hazard mitigation, thereby allowing the acquisition of 4,667 and elevation of 636 homes in North Carolina.  
Figure 2 indicates where these acquisitions and elevations occurred throughout the state. 
                                                          
9 http://www4.ncsu.edu/~nwsfo/storage/cases/19990915/ 
Source: http://www4.ncsu.edu/~nwsfo/storage/cases/19990915/ 
Figure 1: Map of precipitation from Hurricane Floyd in North Carolina 
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Figure 2: Location of Floyd & Fran Buyouts in North Carolina    
Source: North Carolina Emergency Management (NCEM) 
Glavovic and Smith (2014) explain that once homes were acquired, some homeowners, especially low-
income homeowners, had difficulty purchasing a new house.  Lower-income buyout participants were 
often unable to afford a similarly sized home. The value of the home bought out was far below the cost 
of buyout a home in market. North Carolina state officials recognized this discrepancy and created a 
program, the State Acquisition and Relocation Fund (SARF), to overcome this obstacle. SARF provided up 
to $75,000 in gap funding per buyout participant to find a comparable home to move into after theirs was 
acquired. Still, the supply of affordable housing, stemming from the fact that much of the affordable 
housing stock was damaged by Fran and Floyd, was a barrier to finding another house. To compound the 
problem, there is no requirement to rebuild affordable housing after homes are bought out, thus severely 
reducing affordable housing stock post-disaster. These circumstances are common post-disaster and 
create significant pressure on the housing market as demand outpaces supply and the supply that remains 
does not fit the demand.  
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Figure 3: Cities with the Most Acquisitions and Elevations in NC 
Source: NCEM 
After the buyouts following Fran and Floyd, community landscapes resembled a checkerboard of green 
spaces and remaining homes. The homes that remain in buyout neighborhoods were either were not 
flooded at all, not flooded significantly to justify a buyout, did not pass the cost-benefit analysis required 
by FEMA to be offered a buyout, or qualified for a buyout but the homeowner did not participate. 
Neighborhoods with buyouts are more vulnerable to flooding than areas without and given the likelihood 
of increased severe weather patterns due to climate change, buyout neighborhoods will likely become 
more vulnerable to flooding as the floodplain expands. 
 
V. Methodology 
Using Housing Mortgage Disclosure Act data, I complied a dataset of 183,364 conventional, home 
purchase loan applications in North Carolina from 2004 to 2015. Looking at home purchase loans 
addresses the question of wealth building through homeownership more directly and only using 
conventional loans better reflects adjustments in the private lender environment. Each loan application 
was joined with decennial census data for the census tract that it corresponded to. In the process of 
creating this dataset I removing applications without a recorded census tract,10 applicant race, sex, 
                                                          
10 Lenders are allowed to suppress census tract numbers for small counties (less than 30,000 population) 
regardless of whether they are within or outside of an MSA. Additionally, for pre-approval lenders do not need to 
report geographic information for applicants that are denied or approved but do not accept the loan. (Avery et al., 
2007) 
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amount applied for in the loan, or applicant income. I also only analyzed Black and White applicants and l 
loans for owner-occupied units.  
The data set treats the individual loan applicant as the unit of observation. To determine the relative 
concentration of buyouts in a census tract, I created a variable that represents the ratio of total buyouts 
to total number of units in a tract. This is referred to as the buyout ratio. This ratio was also joined to each 
loan application corresponding to the census tract in the decade the observation occurred.  
I ran a series of logistic regressions estimating the likelihood of being approved for a home loan. I used 
loan approval or denial as the dependent variable and a series of HMDA variables, decennial census tract 
variables, and the variable describing the buyout properties to total housing units ratio (buyout ratio) in 
each tract as the independent variables (Table 1 & 2). In addition to logistic regressions, I conducted a 
series of independent sample t-tests for at the census tract level (operationalized as the neighborhood) 
comparing neighborhoods without buyouts to those with buyouts in 2000 and 2010 and their change from 
2000 to 2010.  
Data limitations 
There are a limited number of tracts with higher buyout ratios compared to those with lower making the 
accuracy in the model much higher for approval likelihoods in areas with fewer buyouts. The amount of 
the loan application, income of the loan applicant, and the buyout ratio are also skewed. To correct for 
the skewness, I took the log of the loan amount and the applicant’s income.  
Most studies on home loan approval rates emphasizes the importance of credit scores and debt to income 
ratios. This information is not recorded in HMDA data and therefore is not included in this analysis. 
However, using indicators of economic stability such as income, unemployment rates, median house 
value, and poverty rates serve as proxies for credit scores and debt to income ratios. 
Using HMDA data to study rural tracts also presents challenges. Small or non-metropolitan lenders are 
exempt from HMDA disclosure requirements which limits the comprehensiveness of the dataset. In 
particular, for North Carolina, many of the areas impacted by Fran and Floyd are rural. Additionally, the 
date a loan is recorded refers to the date an action was taken on the loan, not the date of filing the 
application. Denials tend to be recorded faster than approvals. Therefore, there may be a slight lag in the 
approval rates. 
Lenders are allowed to suppress census tract numbers for loans in counties with populations under 30,000 
although most do report this data (Avery, Brevoort, & Canner, 2007). Therefore, it is more difficult to 
study the impact of buyouts on home credit access in rural areas. Unfortunately, many of the buyouts 
from Hurricane’s Fran and Floyd occurred in rural North Carolina.   
Additional data limitations stem from the change in the type of data reported in 2000 census data 
compared to 2010. As a result, American Community Survey 5-year estimates (2008-2012) were used for 
median household income, black and white median household income, unemployment rate, median rent, 
percent with high school education or less, and poverty rate. Because most of the buyouts occurred in 
low-density areas of North Carolina, there is a question of how accurate the ACS data is for certain tracts, 
given their margin of error.  
Finally, the percent of buyouts in a neighborhood is likely highly correlated with the neighborhood’s flood 
risk. Therefore, this study contributes to larger discussions of how flood risk (made evident post-disaster) 
can impact neighborhood change and alter community response to financial crises. This analysis however 
does not control for flood extent from Floyd and Fran because of a lack of access to accurate flood extent 
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and depth data. An even more robust analysis would also include level of flooding in structures that 
participated and did not participate in the buyout program. 
Summary of data used in logistic regression  
Table 1: Variable definitions 
Source: HMDA 2004-2015, NCEM, Decennial Census 2000 & 2010, ACS 5-year estimates (2008-2012) 
Table 1 above describes the variables included in the regression analysis. It is a mix of categorical, 
continuous, and discrete variables that represent factors influencing the likelihood of loan approval. The 
“acquired” variable is the variable of interest as it represents the buyout ratio of the total properties 
bought out to the total number of housing units in the tract of the loan application.  
 
VI. Findings 
Before reporting the results from the regression analyses and t-tests, I summarize the descriptive statistics 
of the variables included in the analysis in Table 2.  
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of variables included in the t-tests 2000 and 2010 
Variable Name Definition 
Acquired Ratio of total buyouts from Floyd and Fran to total number of units in the tract  
Approved 0=denial 1=approved loan application 
White_applicant 0=Black 1=White 
Female 0=male 1=female 
Logamount log of the amount asked for in the loan application 
Logincome log of the income of the loan applicant 
Cosigner 0=no cosigner 1=yes cosigner 
Loan to income ratio (loainc) Loan amount divided by the income of the applicant 
Year Each application given a binary code for year (ex: If year=2004, yr04=1, if not 2004, yr04=0 
Density Population density of the tract per square mile 
Owner_occupied (%) Percent of owner-occupied units in tract 
Housing value (median) median house value in tract 
Vacancy (%) Percent vacant housing units in tract 
Unemployment (%) Percent of population unemployed in tract 
White (%) Percent of total population that is White in tract 
Variable 2000 2010 
 Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
Acquisitions 2.1388 16.809 0 525 2.1388 16.809 0 525 
Population 3,688.961 1,507.585 .61 12751 4,374.08 1,856.57 0 14,377 
Black (%) 21.33% 21.52% 0% 99.66% 22.45% 21.59% 0% 100% 
White (%) 70.83% 23.88% 0.11% 98.92% 65.2% 25.1% 0% 99.16% 
Median household income ($) $47,478.62 $18,339.08 $5,128.44 $162,550.70 $49,572.53 $22,902.35 $4,265 $213,631 
White median household income ($) $50,304.20 $18,300.95 $2,819.80 $161,420.10 $54,376.39 $23,046.04 $2,499 $194,896 
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Source: HMDA 2004-2015, NCEM, Decennial Census 2000 & 2010, ACS 5-year estimates (2008-2012) 
The average number of buyouts in a tract is just over 2. Incomes grew from 2000 to 2010 and house values 
grew slightly.  Black and Hispanic populations grew as a proportion of the total population while White 
declined. Labor force participation dropped, percent in poverty increased significantly, and the rate of 
owner-occupied housing units dropped significantly.  
 
Table 3: Summary Statistics of Variables included in the Regression Analysis 
Black median household income ($) $38,781.46 $19,675.60 $2,819.80 $172,537.90 $41,228.74 $28,805.98 $2,499 $250,001 
Per capita income ($) $23,642.80 $9,377.302 $3,850 $100,641.60 $25,540.85 $22605.79 $2,059 $177,039 
Civilian labor force (%) 63.58% 9.78% 1.2% 89.66% 60.82% 10.78% 0% 100% 
Unemployment (%) 5.44% 4.64% 0% 51.57% 11.19% 5.94% 0% 50.41% 
Poverty (%) 12.24% 8.82% 0% 93.23% 17.63% 12.19% 0% 96.25% 
White poverty (%) 9.19% 8.7% 0% 100% 13.07% 11.58% 0% 100% 
Black poverty (%) 19.13% 15.26% 0% 100% 25.52% 22.91% 0% 100% 
Median House Value ($) $123,179.20 $60,867.02 $0 $618,233.90 $168,569.30 $99,003.80 $10,600 $1,000,001 
Median Rent ($) $521.09 $187.95 $0 $1,444.17 $557.22 $403.24 $0 $2.790 
Owner Occupied (%) 62.02% 18.17% 0% 95.59% 57.42% 19.5% 0% 100% 
Occupied (%) 89.69% 9.95% 10.34% 100% 87.22% 11.25% 0% 100% 
Source Variable Type Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Floyd Buyouts by 
Census Tract 
(acquired 2017) 


















Approval Binary 0.899 0.302 0 1 
White_applicant Binary 0.806 0.395 0 1 
Female Binary 0.343 0.475 0 1 
Logamount Continuous 11.713 0.823 6.907 15.687 
Logincome Continuous 11.08 0.696 6.907 16.092 
Loaninc Continuous 2.32 7.1 0.13 2590 
Cosigner Binary 0.418 0.493 0 1 
Yr04 Binary .119 .324 0 1 
Yr05 Binary .148 .355 0 1 
Yr06 Binary .144 .351 0 1 
Yr07 Binary .113 .317 0 1 
Yr08 Binary .060 .238 0 1 
Yr09 Binary .040 .197 0 1 
Yr10 Binary .040 .196 0 1 
Yr11 Binary .043 .202 0 1 
Yr12 Binary .041 .198 0 1 
Yr13 Binary .051 .220 0 1 
Yr14 Binary   .049 .217 0 1 
Yr15 Binary .053 .225 0 1 
 Density Discrete 922.8 1194.65 9.337 6929.313 
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Source: HMDA 2004-2015, NCEM, Decennial Census 2000 & 2010, ACS 5-year estimates (2008-2012) 
In Table 3, the “acquired” variable describes the number of properties acquired from the buyouts as a 
percentage of the total number of units in the census tract. This is the primary variable of interest of the 
independent variables listed. The acquired variable’s value ranges from 0.019% to 48.1% in a tract. There 
are significantly more tracts with lower buyout ratios than higher, which results in a larger standard 
deviation and a mean closer to zero. About half of the loan applications also had cosigners and the 
majority of the loan applications occurred prior to the Recession. There are also more White applicants 
than Black and more male applicants than female. Over 70% of the population is White and over 70% of 
the housing units in the tracts of the applications are owner occupied. The vacancy rate in tracts with 
loans is over 10% and the standard deviation is large indicating a wide variation in vacancy rates. The 
median house value is $158,698 and mean unemployment is 6.3%, both with large standard deviations. 
 
Figure 4: Total home purchase loan applications overtime  
Source: Housing Mortgage Disclosure Act Data 2004-2015 
There is an uptick in total loan applications in 2005 and this slowly then quickly falls until 2009 when total 




by Census Tract 
(2000 & 2010)    
& 
ACS 5-year  
(2008-2012) 
Median Household Income ($) Discrete $56,538 $23,032 $7,906 $204,990 
Owner occupied (%) Continuous 70.6% 16.6% 3.3% 96.2% 
Housing value ($) (median) Discrete $158,698 $101,674 $35,660 $871,768 
Vacancy (%) Continuous 10.7% 8.5% 2.8% 77.3% 
Unemployment (%) Continuous 6.3% 4.4% 0.6% 47.5% 


























Figure 5: Number of White and Black home purchase loan applicants in buyout neighborhoods, 2004-2015  
Source: Housing Mortgage Disclosure Act Data 2004-2015 
Figure 5 shows the number of Black and White applicants in neighborhoods with buyouts. Not surprisingly, 
White applicants consistently outpaced Black applicants from 2004 to 2015. The number of Black 
applicants has stabilized since the Recession while the number of White applicants increases slightly. The 
fact that loan applications have not returned to pre-Recession levels is likely due to changes in regulations 
that prevented lenders from originating loans without “[making] a reasonable and good faith 
determination based on verified and documented information that, at the time the loan is consummated, 
the consumer has a reasonable ability to repay the loan, according to its terms, and all applicable taxes, 
insurance . . . , and assessments.”11 These regulatory changes reduced the raw number of applicants by 








                                                          
11 For more details, Caggiano and colleagues (2011) discuss the changes in mortgage lending regulations in the 


























Figure 6: Number of Black applicants as a percent of White applicants in buyout neighborhoods, 2004-
2015 
Source: HMDA 2004-2015 
The number of Black applicants as a percent of White applicants in buyout neighborhoods starts above 
20% and then sharply declines during the Recession. It then jumps back above 20% from 2010 to 2011 
and remains there until 2015, albeit declining from 25% to just above 20% from 2012 to 2015.  I assume 
that due to Dodd Frank, the pool applicants after the Recession are more qualified borrowers than prior 
to the Recession. Therefore, the ratio of Black applicants to White after the Recession is comprised of 
fundamentally different kinds of applicants than prior to the Recession.  
Tract Characteristics – With and without buyouts 
Before analyzing the likelihood of home loan approvals, it is important to understand the characteristics 
of tracts with buyouts compared to those without. Are these neighborhoods fundamentally different? Did 
they change in different ways from 2000 to 2010? How significant is the correlation between the buyout 
ratio and various neighborhood characteristics and how they changed over time? The following analysis, 
using descriptive statistics and t-tests answers these questions. 
I conducted a series of independent sample t-tests comparing areas without buyouts to those with 
buyouts. The data used for this analysis includes 2000 and 2010 census tracts and corresponding census 
variables. The tracts are normalized to 2010 boundaries. This dataset comes from the Longitudinal Tract 
Database12. For year 2010, the LTDB took ACS 2008-2012 estimates for some variables due to the 
inconsistencies in the information collected from 2000 to 2010 decennial censuses. The variables that 
came from the 2010 decennial census are total population, number of White (non-Hispanic), number of 
Black (non-Hispanic), total housing units, occupied housing units, vacant units, renter occupied units, and 
owner-occupied units. 



































The two samples do not have equal variances as there is a total of 1,923 tracts without buyouts and 259 
with buyouts. Tracts with buyouts were coded as “1” and tracts without buyouts “0”. Table 4 provides the 
results of the t-tests (difference = mean(0)-mean(1)). The number of buyouts in a neighborhood ranges 
from 1 to 525 or .001- 48.1% buyout ratio.  
Table 4: T-tests comparing characteristics of neighborhoods with and without buyouts, 2000 and 2010 
Variable 2000 2010 












Black (%)** -7.9478 0 32.75% 19.8% -7.2545 0 32.67% 21.07% 
White (%)** 6.8016 0 60.49% 72.23% 5.3293 0 57.12% 66.29% 
Hispanic (%)** 0.9698 0.3329 4.03% 4.34% 2.3482 0.0194 6.99% 8.16% 
Median household income ($)** 9.3711 0 $38,885.24 $48,640.07 6.7625 0 $41,733.07 $50,661.84 
White median household income ($)** 7.0986 0 $43,715.16 $51,190.07 4.6450 0 $48,992.75 $55,104.80 
Black median household income ($)** 8.2790 0 $30,802.82 $39,852.65 9.4206 0 $30,812.07 $42,732.31 
Per capita income ($)** 5.5766 0 $20,589.46 $24,054.04 3.9761 0.0001 $22,803.79 $25,927.32 
Civilian labor force (%)** 8.9738 0 59.13% 64.18% 4.7792 0 58.46% 61.22% 
Unemployment (%)** -5.2050 0 6.93% 5.24% -4.4875 0 12.92% 10.94% 
Poverty (%)** -8.6882 0 17.22% 11.57% -6.2427 0 22.24% 16.97% 
White poverty (%)** -4.5048 0 11.33% 8.9% -1.9332 0.0540 14.22% 12.88% 
Black poverty (%)** -6.3490 0 25.1% 18.32% -5.8720 0 33.18% 24.46% 
Median House Value ($)** 4.7196 0 $104,651.60 $125,677.20 3.2142 0.0014 $147,834.90 $171,396.80 
Median Rent ($)** 9.4280 0 $430.94 $533.23 -4.2787 0 $662.51 $543.74 
Multi-family units (% of total units) -0.6286 .5300 17.17% 16.38% -0.9532 0.3412 18.34% 17.09% 
Owner Occupied (%)** 4.1425 0 57.71% 62.60% 3.5365 0.0005 53.75% 57.92% 
Occupied (%)** 3.3604 0.0009 87.84% 89.94% 1.3682 0.1721 86.48% 87.32% 
** p<0.05 for 2000 or 2010 
* p<0.10 for 2000 or 2010 
All dollars are in 2010 dollars 
The differences between neighborhoods with and without buyouts are highly significant (p<0.05).  The 
differences between neighborhoods with and without buyouts confirm that buyouts happen mostly in 
areas with a higher percent Black population which correlates to lower median household incomes than 
tracts without buyouts. The percent owner occupied, median house value, median rent, labor force 
participation, and percent White are all higher in areas without buyouts in both 2000 and 2010. 
Conversely, unemployment rates, poverty, and percent Black are all higher in neighborhoods with buyouts 
in both 2000 and 2010. 
Effect of buyouts in conjunction with the Recession on neighborhood change 
Because the buyouts happened from 2000 to 2004, we can examine how buyouts may have affected 
neighborhood change using census data from 2000 to 2010. Additionally, given that the Recession also 
occurred between 2000 and 2010, comparing change in neighborhood characteristics for areas with and 
without buyouts from 2000 to 2010 will also reveal how the Recession interacted with buyout 
neighborhoods and differentially effected neighborhoods with buyouts compared to those without.  To 
examine neighborhood change, I conducted independent-sample t-tests of various neighborhood 
characteristics from 2000 to 2010 and compared neighborhoods with buyouts to those without. Table 5 
provides the results of these t-tests (difference = mean(0)-mean(1)). 
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Table 5: Change in neighborhood characteristics (2000-2010)  
Percent change (2000-2010) t-value p-value  With buyouts  Without 
buyouts 
Population** 2.0566 0.322 10.78% 87.36% 
Black** 3.0210 0.0027 0% 1.26% 
White** -5.0592 0 -3.37% -5.94% 
Hispanic** 2.7126 0.0070 2.96% 3.8% 
Median household income** -2.4283 -0.0157 8.98% 3.79% 
White median household income** -2.1462 0.0328 17.8% 8.19% 
Black median household income** 2.3015 0.0217 6.92% 14.33% 
Per capita income* -1.9644 0.0503 10.76% 7.6% 
Civilian labor force (%)** -5.2595 0 -0.66% -3.03% 
Unemployment (%) -0.7156 0.4748 5.99% 5.71% 
Poverty (%) 0.7242 0.4695 5.01% 5.42% 
White poverty (%)** 2.2569 0.0246 2.69% 3.99% 
Black poverty (%) -1.1732 0.2416 7.85% 6.09% 
Median House Value -0.9672 0.334 42.94% 40.53% 
Median Rent** -8.2546 0 67.1% 11.12% 
Housing Units* 1.7906 0.0735 14.32% 9.98% 
Multi-family units as % of total units (%) -0.7771 0.4375 1.17% 0.77% 
Occupied (%)** -2.9921 0.0030 -1.35% -2.6% 
Owner Occupied (%)* -1.7096 0.0881 -3.96% -4.77% 
** p<0.05 
* p<0.10 
The presence of buyouts is correlated significantly with differences in rates of change for various 
neighborhood characteristics. Tracts with buyouts saw significantly less population growth than 
neighborhoods without buyouts. Unemployment and poverty rates increased more in neighborhoods 
with buyouts and median house values increased much more in neighborhoods without buyouts. Median 
rents in tracts with buyouts saw a significant increase (67.1%) compared to those without (11.12%). The 
loss of housing stock due to the flooding and the buyout program likely put a strain on the housing market 
by reducing the supply at a faster rate than demand. The slight increase in occupied housing as a percent 
of all housing units from 2000 to 2010 for neighborhoods with over 1% buyout ratio supports this 
assumption as well. 
One would expect the percent of Black residents to increase in neighborhoods with buyout and decrease 
in neighborhoods without but this is not the case. One explanation for this finding is that the Hispanic 
population in North Carolina grew as a proportion of the total population from 2000 to 2010. This explains 
why we see a decline in percent White population in both neighborhoods, no change Black percent of 
population in neighborhoods with buyouts and a small increase in percent Black population in 
neighborhoods without buyouts.  
Analysis of home loan approval likelihood in relation to concentration of buyouts using logistic regression  
I performed a logistic regression including all years estimating the likelihood of being approved for a home 
loan depending on the buyout ratio. I then performed logistic regression for particular time periods, the 
pre-Recession (2004-2007) and post-Recession years (2012-2015). I then performed regressions 
comparing Black and White applicants and White and minority neighborhood’s loan approval likelihoods. 
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White neighborhoods were defined as over 70% White because the percent White in North Carolina has 
remained around 70% on average. Neighborhoods with less than 50% White residents were considered 
minority neighborhoods.   
Regression equation 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡(𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑠)
= 𝑏(𝑎𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑) + 𝑏(𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑒) + 𝑏(𝑠𝑒𝑥) + 𝑏(𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡) + 𝑏(𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒) + 𝑏(𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑐)
+  𝑏(𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑒𝑟) + 𝑏(ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔_𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒) + 𝑏(𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡_𝑤ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑒) +  𝑏(𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟) + 𝑏(𝑣𝑎𝑐𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑦)
+ 𝑏(𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛_ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑_𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒) + 𝑏(𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡) + 𝑏(𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑝𝑖𝑒𝑑) + 𝑏(𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦) 
Results from Logistic Regressions 
Table 6: Pre-Recession, all applicants 
Number of observations   96,071    
LR chi2(16)    5646.53    
Prob>chi2    0    
Log likelihood   -30704.86    
Pseudo R2     0.0842    
       
Variable Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% CI] 
acquired -0.167336 0.605588 -0.28 0.782 -1.354267 1.019595 
white_applicant 0.744024 0.0264847 28.09 0 0.692115 0.795933 
female 0.0496884 0.0230437 2.16 0.031 0.0045236 0.0948533 
logamount 0.2568791 0.0224067 11.46 0 0.2129627 0.3007955 
logincome 0.65521 0.030572 21.43 0 0.59529 0.71513 
loaninc 0.0240266 0.0106724 2.25 0.024 0.0031092 0.0449441 
cosigner -0.040965 0.0248191 -1.65 0.099 -0.089609 0.00768 
mhmval12 -3.18E-06 3.53E-07 -9.03 0 -3.88E-06 -2.49E-06 
hinc12 0.0000306 1.52E-06 20.1 0 0.0000276 0.0000336 
pwhite -0.068007 0.0637906 -1.07 0.286 -0.193035 0.05702 
year             
2005 0.0320906 0.0291934 1.1 0.272 -0.025127 0.0893087 
2006 0.0149551 0.0294504 0.51 0.612 -0.042767 0.0726767 
2007 0.147693 0.0328403 4.5 0 0.0833273 0.2120588 
vacancy -0.27089 0.1391974 -1.95 0.052 -0.543712 0.0019315 
owner_occupied -1.741988 0.1321244 -13.18 0 -2.000947 -1.483029 
density 5.98E-06 0.000015 0.4 0.69 -2.35E-05 0.0000354 
_cons -8.66775 0.2566423 -33.77 0 -9.17076 -8.16474 
 
Table 7: Post-Recession, all applicants 
Number of observations   35,652    
LR chi2(16)    620.06    
Prob>chi2    0    
Log likelihood   -8188.749    
Pseudo R2     0.0365    
       
Variable Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% CI] 
acquired 1.035957 1.40266 0.74 0.46 -1.713206 3.785121 
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white_applicant 0.1743336 0.0570565 3.06 0.002 0.062505 0.2861622 
female 0.1321865 0.0474561 2.79 0.005 0.0391742 0.2251988 
logamount 0.4340412 0.03514 12.35 0 0.3651681 0.5029143 
logincome -0.114528 0.0449661 -2.55 0.011 -0.20266 -0.026396 
loaninc -0.01546 0.0039523 -3.91 0 -0.023207 -0.007714 
cosigner 0.2032275 0.0488214 4.16 0 0.1075392 0.2989157 
mhmval12 -5.54E-07 4.05E-07 -1.37 0.171 -1.35E-06 2.38E-07 
hinc12 5.97E-06 2.44E-06 2.45 0.014 0.0000012 0.0000108 
pwhite 0.5933929 0.1419781 4.18 0 0.3151209 0.8716649 
year             
2013 0.1016419 0.0575733 1.77 0.077 -0.0112 0.2144835 
2014 0.4841576 0.0638279 7.59 0 0.3590573 0.609258 
2015 0.5463366 0.0634881 8.61 0 0.4219022 0.6707709 
vacancy -1.136144 0.2596297 -4.38 0 -1.645009 -0.62728 
owner_occupied -0.694653 0.2247551 -3.09 0.002 -1.135164 -0.254141 
density 0.0000562 0.000031 1.81 0.07 -4.55E-06 0.000117 
_cons -1.639219 0.4542166 -3.61 0 -2.529467 -0.748971 
 
Table 8: White applicants post-Recession 
Number of observations   29,059    
LR chi2(16)    445.56    
Prob>chi2    0    
Log likelihood   -6204.961    
Pseudo R2     0.0347    
       
Variable Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% CI]   
acquired -2.972266 1.822564 -1.63 0.103 -6.544426 0.5998946 
female 0.0538836 0.0555317 0.97 0.332 -0.054957 0.1627237 
logamount 0.4420728 0.0406306 10.88 0 0.3624382 0.5217073 
logincome -0.108819 0.0516387 -2.11 0.035 -0.210029 -0.007609 
loaninc -0.016594 0.0041769 -3.97 0 -0.02478 -0.008407 
cosigner 0.1695206 0.0559484 3.03 0.002 0.0598638 0.2791774 
mhmval12 -6.2E-07 4.27E-07 -1.45 0.146 -1.46E-06 2.17E-07 
hinc12 4.94E-06 2.64E-06 1.87 0.062 -2.39E-07 1.01E-05 
pwhite 0.5249216 1.68E-01 3.13 0.002 0.1962087 0.8536346 
year             
2013 0.1241372 0.06766 1.83 0.067 -0.008474 0.2567484 
2014 0.4681603 0.0738471 6.34 0 0.3234226 0.612898 
2015 0.5195373 0.0730637 7.11 0 0.376335 0.6627397 
vacancy -1.272626 0.2758088 -4.61 0 -1.813201 -0.732051 
owner_occupied -0.519576 0.2729893 -1.9 0.057 -1.054625 0.0154734 
density 0.0001054 0.0000356 2.96 0.003 0.0000357 0.000175 





Table 9: Black applicants post-Recession 
Number of observations   6,593    
LR chi2(16)    123.64    
Prob>chi2    0    
Log likelihood   -1961.884    
Pseudo R2     0.0305    
       
Variable Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% CI]   
acquired 5.185746 2.404199 2.16 0.031 0.4736015 9.89789 
female 0.3284216 0.0890755 3.69 0 0.1538367 0.5030064 
logamount 0.3625962 0.0818783 4.43 0 0.2021177 0.5230746 
logincome -0.091149 0.1087165 -0.84 0.402 -0.304229 0.1219318 
loaninc 0.0061227 0.0290372 0.21 0.833 -0.050789 0.0630346 
cosigner 0.2752455 0.1016262 2.71 0.007 0.0760617 0.4744293 
mhmval12 -4.66E-07 0.0000015 -0.31 0.756 -3.4E-06 2.47E-06 
hinc12 9.39E-06 7.16E-06 1.31 0.19 -4.64E-06 2.34E-05 
pwhite 0.6919623 2.98E-01 2.33 0.02 0.1086436 1.275281 
year             
2005 0.0827104 0.1107146 0.75 0.455 -0.134286 0.2997071 
2006 0.5996926 0.1282488 4.68 0 0.3483296 0.8510557 
2007 0.6966856 0.1302783 5.35 0 0.4413449 0.9520263 
vacancy 0.5492382 0.7751745 0.71 0.479 -0.970076 2.068552 
owner_occupied -1.290844 0.428137 -3.02 0.003 -2.129977 -0.451711 
density -0.000154 0.000066 -2.33 0.02 -0.000283 -2.45E-05 
_cons -1.236362 1.027823 -1.2 0.229 -3.250857 0.7781334 
 
Black and White applicants 
At first glance, buyouts seem to not influence the approval of a conventional home purchase loan 
applicant, the “acquired” variable representing the buyout ratio was not significant for either pre or post-
Recession period (Tables 6 & 7). However, looking specifically at White and Black applicants, the buyout 
ratio had a significantly positive impact on approval likelihood for Black applicants after the Recession 
(p>z=0.031) (Table 9). The buyout ratio remains insignificant before the Recession for both Black and 
White applicants (Tables A & B in Appendix) and for White applicants after the Recession (Table 8). 
Depending on the race of the applicant and timing of the application (pre or post-Recession), buyouts had 
varying impacts on loan approval likelihoods.   
White and minority neighborhoods 
Applicants in minority neighborhoods also saw a significant positive relationship between the buyout ratio 
and approval likelihoods both before and after the Recession (p>z=0.086 and p>z=0.041 respectively) 
(Table F in Appendix). For applicants in White neighborhoods, after the Recession there is a significant 
negative relationship (p>z=0) between the buyout ratio and loan approval likelihood (Tables C & E in 
Appendix).  
Variation in the concentration of buyouts 
To assess whether the buyout ratio’s effect on conventional home purchase loan approvals varies as the 
buyout ratio varies, I performed a series of regressions setting the independent variables to their mean 
 25 
values and adjusting the buyout ratio at .001 increments from .001 to .5. I then graphed the estimated 
likelihood of approval at each value. The following graphs describe the likelihood of loan approval given 
changes of the neighborhood’s buyout ratio in which the applicant is applying. The lines describe the 
likelihood of approval at a given buyout ratio holding all other variables constant.  
Figure 9: Post-Recession Approval Likelihoods for Black and White applicants 
Source: HMDA 2004-2015, NCEM, Decennial Census 2000 & 2010, ACS 5-year estimates (2008-2012) 
After the Recession, the buyout ratio White and Black applicants differently. On average, White 
applicant’s likelihood of loan approval declined as the buyout ratio increased. Black applicant’s approval 
likelihood increased as the buyout ratio increased. In the tracts with lower buyout ratios, White applicant’s 
approval likelihoods are higher than Black applicants. They then flip at about 0.03 buyout ratio.  
Figure 10: White Applicants before and after the Recession 
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The buyout ratio’s influence on White approval likelihoods is smaller before the Recession than after.  The 
trend remains that as the buyout ratio increases, White approval likelihoods decrease.  
Figure 11: Before and After the Recession Black Applicants 
Source: HMDA 2004-2015, NCEM, Decennial Census 2000 & 2010, ACS 5-year estimates (2008-2012) 
In contrast to White applicants, Black applicants saw a significant change in their approval likelihood from 
before and after the Recession. The buyout ratio became more significant after the Recession for Black 
applicants.  
Figure 12: Post-Recession Loan Approval Likelihood for Majority White and Minority Neighborhoods 
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After the Recession, applicants in minority neighborhoods with buyouts were more likely to be approved 
for a loan than those in White neighborhoods with buyouts. Both applicants in minority and White 
neighborhoods increase their approval likelihood as the buyout ratio increases at about the same rate. 
Discussion of Findings 
At first an increase in buyouts leading to an increased likelihood of loan approval would seem counter 
intuitive, but the explanation lies in the relationship between incomes, loan amounts, home values, and 
the relative differences in these values between areas with and without buyouts. It is logical to assume 
that because neighborhoods with buyouts have lower home values and median household incomes than 
those without, applicant’s in these neighborhoods have to put in a smaller down payment to be approved 
for a loan. To test this assumption, Table 10 below compares incomes and loan amounts in areas with and 
without buyouts. 
Table 10: Applicant income and loan amount pre- and post-Recession for home purchase loans 
 
Pre-Recession (2004-2007) Post-Recession (2012-2015) 
















$      93,160 $175,959 $     92,082 $ 192,947 -1.2% 9.65% 
With 
Buyouts 
$      88,204 $ 165,604 $     87,650 $ 174,461 -0.06% 5.3% 
 
The average loan amount for applicants in buyout neighborhoods is lower than non-buyout 
neighborhoods both before and after the Recession. From before to after the Recession, the average loan 
amount increased more for applicants in neighborhoods without buyouts while incomes in neighborhoods 
with and without buyouts stayed relatively stable. Median house values in buyout neighborhoods 
remained lower than those without buyouts (Table 4) and did not change as much as non-buyout 
neighborhoods pre to post-Recession (Table 5). Additionally, the loan amounts applied for in 
neighborhoods with buyouts were lower and increased less pre- to post-Recession than neighborhoods 
without buyouts (Table 9 above). The results in Table 9 confirm that the likely reason for an increase in 
approval likelihoods in buyout areas is related to the disproportionate effect of the Recession on incomes 
and home values in areas with buyouts compared to those without.  
 
VII. Conclusion and Implications 
This research reveals crucial insights into the disproportionate exposure of Black households and 
neighborhoods to the negative impacts of the buyouts in North Carolina following Fran and Floyd.  The 
communities that participated in the buyout program were and still are economically disadvantaged, 
which translates into relatively lower home values and higher unemployment and poverty rates. The 
comparison of neighborhood change between buyout and non-buyout neighborhoods shows that the 
conditions of the communities that participated in the buyout program did not improve from 2000 to 
2010 compared to those without buyouts (Table 5). While the Recession induced economic hardship for 
most of North Carolina and the US, neighborhoods with higher concentrations of buyouts were harder 
hit. Among other indicators of economic hardship, they saw a smaller increase in median house value, a 
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decline in labor force participation, and a significant increase in median rents among other indicators of 
economic hardship (Table 5).13  
While homeownership is touted as the primary means of building wealth, the longevity of an investment 
in a buyout neighborhood is uncertain due to its proximity to the floodplain. The households leftover in a 
buyout neighborhood were either not significantly damaged from flooding, did not pass FEMA’s cost 
benefit analysis to qualify, or qualified but refused the buyout offer. In general, neighborhoods with 
buyouts are at higher risk of flooding than areas without buyouts. For many areas, this risk will likely only 
increase in the future as climate change produces more severe weather events and extends the floodplain 
boundary.  
Black borrowers are able to invest in homes in neighborhoods at risk of flooding and this could have long-
term ramifications for increasing the racial wealth disparity. Investing in a home in a buyout neighborhood 
may be a smart financial decision, but the vulnerability of that investment, because of its flood risk, is not 
accounted for in the value of the home. If it were, it would likely prevent one from investing in it to build 
wealth. The market is essentially incentivizing investment in environmentally vulnerable areas through 
lower home values in flood prone areas.  
Buyouts only become a statistically significant factor of loan approvals for Black applicants after the 
Recession. Before the Recession the buyouts had no significant impact on the likelihood of loan approvals 
but after the Recession, buyout neighborhood’s lower home values presented an opportunity for home 
ownership for lower or moderate-income borrowers; unfortunately, this opportunity is mostly in high risk 
areas. In turn, the Recession affected buyout neighborhoods differently than it did non-buyout 
neighborhoods.  This ultimately undermines the security of lower and middle-class borrower’s 
investment. In particular, Black households have disproportionately invested in these high-risk 
neighborhoods. As a consequence, Black borrowers are at risk of losing their investment and failing to 
build wealth more so than their White counterparts.  
The disproportionate impact on Black households is not an innate characteristic of the buyout program. 
A community’s affordable housing stock is often destroyed after a flooding event as most naturally 
occurring affordable housing and public housing is vulnerable to flooding (Glavovic & Smith 2014). As 
Glavovic and Smith explain, after Fran and Floyd, the loss of affordable housing posed a serious issue and 
inhibited municipalities ability to attract residents back to their communities. Therefore, the issue is not 
the location of buyouts but the location of affordable housing. If there is little affordable housing outside 
of flood prone areas, home buyers looking for more affordable investment options outside of high-risk 
areas have little recourse than to make the riskier investment.  
The findings from this study highlight the consequences disasters reducing affordable for-sale housing 
options. There is a shortage of less risky home investment opportunities for lower income borrowers that 
can still allow them to build wealth and the buyout program unfortunately exacerbates this. The way to 
increase low-risk homeownership opportunities for lower income households is to increase the affordable 
for-sale housing stock outside of the floodplain. Implementation of such a project is easier said than done 
as it would require significant community engagement and coordination among multiple stakeholders and 
levels of government, particularly in a post-disaster setting.  In partnership with developers, state, and 
federal recovery professionals, towns could incentivize construction of for-sale naturally occurring 
affordable housing outside of the floodplain, relieving the pressure on the housing market post-disaster. 
                                                          
13 Other indicators of economic hardship include increased poverty rate and higher unemployment. Additionally, 
after disasters, renters are less likely to return to their residences so a decline in renters reflects this tendency 
(Kamel, 2012; Mueller, Bell, Chang, & Henneberger, 2011). 
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Practically speaking, naturally occurring affordable housing will be smaller than surrounding homes so as 
to be more affordable. While size may deter borrowers from investing in a home, if the intention of the 
borrower is to make a secure investment to build wealth, investing in a smaller home not exposed to flood 
risk would provide more security.  
The conversation surrounding affordable housing post-disaster focuses on rebuilding rental units. I 
emphasize in importance of naturally occurring affordable housing because this analysis shows there is a 
demand is for for-sale affordable units, not rentals. Constructing subsidized affordable housing through 
the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit would serve renters and demand for affordable home investment 
options would still not be redirected out of the floodplain. This is not to say that affordable rental housing 
is not an equally important issue, but, LIHTC is not a solution for the purpose of addressing the 
disproportionate risk of Black borrowers making high risk investments. 
It is important to note that the ability to create more affordable housing that will remain affordable for 
years to come may be an option unique to rural areas. For example, this suggestion may be irrelevant in 
post-Sandy New York, where most construction, may still become unaffordable for those looking for lower 
cost home investment opportunities (regardless of if it was inside or outside of the floodplain, or the size 
of the house). In rural areas with stable or declining populations, the risk of housing markets outpricing 
lower-income investors is lower. Additionally, the opportunities for infill development in less dense rural 
settings may be greater. 
There are also significant complexities and complications to building new housing stock in any municipality 
or community especially after a disaster. There is often a strong racial and economic divide between areas 
in and outside of the floodplain. This is a significant issue, in rural North Carolina. Cultural difference 
intertwined with unequal economic opportunity are often long standing and deeply entrenched in the 
social fabric of a town. Building more affordable for-sale housing outside of the floodplain would likely 
disrupt familiar and established racial, economic, and cultural divides. It may also bring concerns over 
home devaluation if smaller homes are sited near larger ones. The complexity of each communities’ 
situation and needs would have to be considered in any proposed development.  
Considering the legacy of residential segregation and environmental racism in the U.S., it is not surprising 
that Black populations today reside in proximity to the floodplain. However, buyouts do not automatically 
result in negative outcomes for participating neighborhoods or exposure to high-risk investment for Black 
borrowers.  The conditions of the neighborhoods in which buyouts occur are crucial to better 
understanding how buyouts may impact different groups. The buyout program should be implemented 
with an understanding of how it may impact the neighborhoods that participate given their particular 
context.   
If we are aware of the potential consequences of the buyout program prior to a flood event, we can then 
take proactive steps to better utilize the opportunities that they present and mitigate against 
neighborhood decline in the neighborhoods that participate. Pre-disaster planning for buyouts would 
allow communities to use them as an opportunity to add an amenity and mitigate potential negative 
effects. A portion of HMGP and CDBG-DR hazard mitigation funding could be redirected to developing 
open space plans in buyout areas and the creation of affordable housing. The funding amount could be 
tied to the rate of buyout participation. Such targeted support would increase a community’s future 
resilience and likely increase the odds of retaining the population after a disaster. A programmatic 
adjustment of this sort would likely require more funding upfront but would significantly minimize future 
losses and the negative impacts of disasters.  
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The findings from this research have far reaching implications for disaster recovery policy and add to our 
understanding of how buyouts interact with financial crises and contribute to racial disparities. While 
buyout neighborhoods may create opportunities for Black homeownership, they may not be good wealth 
building opportunities. Creating affordable for-sale housing options outside of the floodplain will increase 
a community’s resilience to future disasters. Additionally, pre-disaster planning for buyouts that account 
for these predictable outcomes can mitigate their negative consequences.  
 
Notes and suggestions for future research 
The results from this research imply that the use of buyouts as a hazard mitigation strategy is producing 
market conditions that further segregate residential areas. Future research should look further into this 
hypothesis to understand how neighborhood diversity and economic opportunity change in communities, 
towns, and cities that participate in the buyout program. Anecdotally, some towns in North Carolina noted 
a jump in foreclosure rates in the years after Floyd and have attributed this to the fact that buyout 
participants received the extra SARF money from the State and purchased a home but their incomes did 
not change and they could not keep up with taxes and mortgage payments. Future research on this topic 
should use foreclosure rates to assess the impact of the buyouts before and after the Recession. Relatedly, 
future research should assess how neighborhoods adjacent to areas with buyouts are impacted by the 
program’s implementation. Buyout participants move to other areas, purchasing or renting homes, maybe 
being foreclosed on in the years after, effecting surrounding housing markets. Another important 
question to answer outside of the scope of this project includes understanding how banks loaned to 
buyout participants in North Carolina who not only received a check for the value of their home but the 


















Table A: Pre-Recession White applicants 
Number of observations   78,569    
LR chi2(16)    3073.92    
Prob>chi2    0    
Log likelihood   -22109.8    
Pseudo R2     0.065    
       
Variable Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% CI]   
acquired -0.70193 0.8889985 -0.79 0.43 -2.444335 1.040475 
female 0.0325858 0.0282492 1.15 0.249 -0.022782 0.0879532 
logamount 0.3176626 0.0241255 13.17 0 0.2703775 0.3649478 
logincome 0.6187845 0.0337114 18.36 0 0.5527114 0.6848576 
loaninc 0.0147137 0.010774 1.37 0.172 -0.006403 0.0358304 
cosigner 0.0272755 0.0290956 0.94 0.349 -0.029751 0.0843019 
mhmval12 -3.63E-06 3.96E-07 -9.15 0 -4.4E-06 -2.85E-06 
hinc12 3.23E-05 1.80E-06 17.93 0 2.88E-05 3.58E-05 
pwhite 0.1957656 8.45E-02 2.32 0.021 0.0301159 0.3614154 
year             
2005 0.066869 0.0349886 1.91 0.056 -0.001707 0.1354455 
2006 0.0426071 0.0353767 1.2 0.228 -0.02673 0.1119441 
2007 0.224901 0.0394285 5.7 0 0.1476224 0.3021795 
vacancy -0.1989 0.1651293 -1.2 0.228 -0.522548 0.1247474 
owner_occupied -2.277669 0.1739921 -13.09 0 -2.618687 -1.93665 
density -4.22E-05 0.0000195 -2.17 0.03 -8.03E-05 -4.02E-06 
_cons -8.065027 0.3044399 -26.49 0 -8.661718 -7.468336 
 
Table B: Pre-Recession Black applicants 
Number of observations   17,502    
LR chi2(16)    892.92    
Prob>chi2    0    
Log likelihood   -8533.655    
Pseudo R2     0.0497    
       
Variable Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% CI]   
acquired 1.020607 0.8670024 1.18 0.239 -0.678687 2.7199 
female 0.0802312 0.0396162 2.03 0.043 0.0025849 0.1578775 
logamount 0.0793889 0.0484458 1.64 0.101 -0.015563 0.1743409 
logincome 0.7585906 0.0643722 11.78 0 0.6324234 0.8847577 
loaninc 0.0553885 0.024008 2.31 0.021 0.0083337 0.1024434 
cosigner -0.250723 0.0474906 -5.28 0 -0.343802 -0.157643 
mhmval12 -3.06E-06 9.81E-07 -3.12 0.002 -4.98E-06 -1.13E-06 
hinc12 3.31E-05 3.21E-06 10.33 0 2.68E-05 3.94E-05 
pwhite -0.394007 1.07E-01 -3.68 0 -0.604008 -0.184005 
year             
2005 -0.048421 0.05292 -0.91 0.36 -0.152143 0.0553 
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2006 -0.040491 0.0530532 -0.76 0.445 -0.144473 0.0634917 
2007 -0.022801 0.0597646 -0.38 0.703 -0.139938 0.0943352 
vacancy -0.65026 0.2696454 -2.41 0.016 -1.178755 -0.121764 
owner_occupied -1.286538 0.2151963 -5.98 0 -1.708315 -0.864761 
density 0.0000398 0.0000246 1.62 0.106 -8.39E-06 0.0000879 
_cons -8.003797 0.4963493 -16.13 0 -8.976624 -7.03097 
 
Table C: Pre-Recession White neighborhoods 
Number of observations 60,087    
LR chi2(16) 2781.03    
Prob>chi2 0    
Log likelihood -16605.06    
Pseudo R2 0.0773    
       
Variable Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% CI] 
acquired -2.042565 2.036818 -1 0.316 -6.034655 1.949525 
white_applicant 0.8365546 0.043213 19.36 0 0.7518586 0.9212505 
female 0.0595951 0.032539 1.83 0.067 -0.00418 0.1233704 
logamount 0.3326291 0.0254933 13.05 0 0.2826632 0.382595 
logincome 0.6097893 0.0367593 16.59 0 0.5377424 0.6818361 
loaninc 0.0127294 0.0097756 1.3 0.193 -0.00643 0.0318893 
cosigner 0.0363691 0.0334068 1.09 0.276 -0.029107 0.1018452 
mhmval12 -4.06E-06 4.64E-07 -8.75 0 -4.97E-06 -3.15E-06 
hinc12 0.0000301 2.25E-06 13.43 0 0.0000257 0.0000345 
pwhite -1.065111 0.2042253 -5.22 0 -1.465386 -0.664837 
year             
2005 0.0688213 0.0401708 1.71 0.087 -0.009912 0.1475546 
2006 0.0391925 0.0408848 0.96 0.338 -0.04094 0.1193253 
2007 0.137526 0.0451231 3.05 0.002 0.0490863 0.2259656 
vacancy 0.191684 0.2048936 0.94 0.35 -0.2099 0.593268 
owner_occupied -1.82677 0.249914 -7.31 0 -2.316593 -1.336948 
density 0.0000423 0.0000274 1.54 0.122 -1.14E-05 0.000096 
_cons -8.108575 0.3758124 -21.58 0 -8.845154 -7.371996 
 
Table D: Pre-Recession minority neighborhoods 
Number of observations 8,344    
LR chi2(16) 435.32    
Prob>chi2 0    
Log likelihood -3629.57    
Pseudo R2 0.0566    
       
Variable Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% CI] 
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acquired 1.310184 0.7412559 1.77 0.077 -0.142651 2.763019 
white_applicant 0.4979033 0.0673934 7.39 0 0.3658146 0.629992 
female 0.1067798 0.0621978 1.72 0.086 -0.015126 0.2286853 
logamount 0.0854847 0.0742885 1.15 0.25 -0.060118 0.2310874 
logincome 0.659697 0.0977208 6.75 0 0.4681678 0.8512261 
loaninc 0.0404004 0.0383123 1.05 0.292 -0.03469 0.1154912 
cosigner -0.132539 0.0759978 -1.74 0.081 -0.281492 0.0164141 
mhmval12 1.04E-05 2.13E-06 4.88 0 6.22E-06 1.46E-05 
hinc12 0.0000215 5.82E-06 3.7 0 0.0000101 0.000033 
pwhite -0.324494 0.2599405 -1.25 0.212 -0.833968 0.1849805 
year             
2005 -0.004662 0.0846389 -0.06 0.956 -0.170552 0.1612268 
2006 0.0094722 0.0844871 0.11 0.911 -0.156119 0.1750637 
2007 0.1145434 0.0926595 1.24 0.216 -0.067066 0.2961526 
vacancy 0.1308925 0.3221549 0.41 0.685 -0.50052 0.7623046 
owner_occupied -0.560849 0.3318582 -1.69 0.091 -1.21128 0.0895807 
density -4.14E-07 0.0000277 -0.01 0.988 -5.47E-05 0.0000539 
_cons -8.339089 0.7821173 -10.66 0 -9.872011 -6.806167 
 
Table E: Post-Recession White neighborhoods 
Number of observations   20,427    
LR chi2(16)    273.05    
Prob>chi2    0    
Log likelihood   -4080.833    
Pseudo R2     0.0324    
       
Variable Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% CI] 
acquired -19.88682 5.162091 -3.85 0 -30.00433 -9.769311 
white_applicant 0.2286056 0.1142809 2 0.045 0.0046192 0.452592 
female 0.0414437 0.0700332 0.59 0.554 -0.095819 0.1787063 
logamount 0.4433799 0.0534276 8.3 0 0.3386638 0.548096 
logincome -0.212681 0.0642631 -3.31 0.001 -0.338635 -0.086728 
loaninc -0.022059 0.0047081 -4.69 0 -0.031287 -0.012831 
cosigner 0.1326662 0.0683955 1.94 0.052 -0.001387 0.2667189 
mhmval12 -4.00E-08 4.89E-07 -0.08 0.935 -9.98E-07 9.19E-07 
hinc12 -3.09E-06 2.96E-06 -1.05 0.296 -8.9E-06 2.71E-06 
pwhite 0.0764407 0.4502229 0.17 0.865 -0.80598 0.9588614 
year             
2013 0.1508629 0.0848849 1.78 0.076 -0.015509 0.3172342 
2014 0.4622862 0.0914848 5.05 0 0.2829793 0.6415932 
2015 0.5410556 0.0912283 5.93 0 0.3622514 0.7198597 
vacancy -0.783224 0.3237879 -2.42 0.016 -1.417837 -0.148611 
owner_occupied 0.7711028 0.3706845 2.08 0.038 0.0445746 1.497631 
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density 0.0002572 0.0000521 4.94 0 0.0001551 0.0003593 
_cons -1.04124 0.7134641 -1.46 0.144 -2.439604 0.3571236 
 
Table F: Post-Recession minority neighborhoods 
Number of observations   5,580    
LR chi2(16)    117.44    
Prob>chi2    0    
Log likelihood   -1579.896    
Pseudo R2     0.0358    
       
Variable Coef. Std. Err. z P>z [95% CI] 
acquired 4.486709 2.191851 2.05 0.041 0.1907608 8.782657 
white_applicant 0.3071082 0.1046933 2.93 0.003 0.1019132 0.5123032 
female 0.1892501 0.1016732 1.86 0.063 -0.010026 0.3885258 
logamount 0.3437959 0.0821476 4.19 0 0.1827896 0.5048023 
logincome 0.0377794 0.1151268 0.33 0.743 -0.187865 0.2634238 
loaninc 0.0087881 0.0245636 0.36 0.721 -0.039356 0.0569318 
cosigner 0.2053326 0.1150009 1.79 0.074 -0.020065 0.4307302 
mhmval12 -7.34E-07 1.98E-06 -0.37 0.71 -4.61E-06 3.14E-06 
hinc12 0.0000291 8.49E-06 3.42 0.001 0.0000124 0.0000457 
pwhite 0.4314626 0.4359922 0.99 0.322 -0.423067 1.285992 
year             
2013 -0.105229 0.1276722 -0.82 0.41 -0.355462 0.1450036 
2014 0.2980374 0.1424231 2.09 0.036 0.0188932 0.5771815 
2015 0.3302893 0.1407695 2.35 0.019 0.0543862 0.6061925 
vacancy -1.136398 0.9643051 -1.18 0.239 -3.026401 0.7536057 
owner_occupied -1.860644 0.4258134 -4.37 0 -2.695223 -1.026065 
density -0.000117 0.0000533 -2.19 0.029 -0.000221 -1.21E-05 
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